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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LYLE BOLGEH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
BETH EDWARDS and CLYDE L. 
EDWARDS, 
Def enda·ntl) and Respondents. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 10261 
Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
The Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, Judge 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is brought on a promissory note which 
Plaintiff contends has been only partially satisfied and 
Defendants contend no promissory note has been exe-
cuted, and further that any obligation owing was satisfied 
by a return of certain merchandise from said Defendants 
to said Plaintiff Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
rrhe lower court held no promissory note was exe-
euted and that there was a return of certain merchandise, 
satisfying any obligation owing by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff, and entered its decret> dismissing the complaint 
of the Plaintiff with prejudice on the 30th day of Octo-
ber, 1964. 
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RELIEF SOUGHrr ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Appellant requests the judgment of the 
lower court be reversed and that a judgment be granted 
in favor of the Plaintiff Appellant in the sum of $354.28, 
together with interest at the rate of eight per cent per 
annum from the date of judgment until paid in full, and 
costs incurred herein. 
S~l1ATEMENT OF FACTS 
For some time prior to March 5, 1960, the Plaintiff 
Appellant, Mrs. Lyle Bolger, and the Defendant Respond-
ent Beth Edwards represented Stanley Products Com-
pany for the sale of certain merchandise in the particular 
locale in which they resided. While both parties were so 
engaged, the Defendant Mrs. Beth Edwards purchased 
from time to time certain merchandise from the Plaintiff 
paying the Plaintiff upon delivery of the goods (Tr. 8). 
Shortly prior to March 5, 1960, Plaintiff ceased doing 
business for Stanley Products Company and had a large 
supply of merchandise in stock. There is some conflict 
in the testimony as to whether or not the Plaintiff re-
quested Defendants to store the merchandise or whether 
it was to be sold to the Defendants by the Plaintiff. How-
ever, on the 5th day of March, 1960, Defendants and each 
of them, Beth Edwards and Clyde Edwards, drove to 
the home of the Plaintiff in Salt Lake City from their 
home located in Orem, Utah, and received certain mer-
chandise which was stored in a duplex owned by the 
Plaintiff. At this time they executed a document identi-
fied as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is purported to be a 
promissory note (Tr. 9). Said notP provided for payment 
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of $75.00 or more per month until the total sum of $422.98 
had been paid. In the amended a1rnwer of Defendants 
(Page 9, Record on Appeal) the Defendant Beth Ed-
wards admitted execution of said note, but it was con-
tended that the document was not a promissory note, 
and further that the Defendant Clyde Edwards did not 
execute the same. On cross-examination the Defendant 
Beth Edwards stated that the note was not a complicated 
document and that slw understood it (Tr. 36). There is 
no testimony given to the effect that Defendant Clyde 
L. Edwards did not understand the document that he 
later admitted executing (Tr. 50). The Plaintiff testified 
that the consideration for said promissory note was the 
merchandise admitted to have been received by the De-
fendants, an inventory of which was made at the time 
that the merchandise was picked up, and introduced into 
evidence as Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3. 
Mrs. Bolger testified that there was never any con-
versation made relative to the storing of said merchan-
dise for her (Tr. 10), although the Defendants each con-
tended to the contrary. The Plaintiff alleged in the 
amended complaint (Page 7, Record on Appeal) that the 
Defendants had returned certain merchandise in the 
value of $43.70 in partial satisfaction of said promissory 
note, and had paid in addition $25.00 in cash, which was 
to apply as a credit upon said promissory note, thereby 
leaving a balance due and owing to the Plaintiff from the 
Defendants and each of them in the sum of $354.28. The 
Def <>ndant l\Irs. Edwards testified that a receipt for 
eertain merchandise which was received by the Plaintiff 
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was given to the Plaintiff (Tr. 42) and further that 
when anyone picked up merchandise she filled out a re-
ceipt card. The Plaintiff's testimony corresponds with 
that of the Defendant in this instance (Tr. 17). The De-
fendant Beth Edwards testified that after March 5, 
1960, the date of the note, she was under no obligation for 
any sum of money to the Plaintiff (Tr. 36). Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7 was then presented to the Defendant Beth 
Edwards, which was a letter dated October 5, 1960, from 
Mrs. Edwards to Mrs. Bolger, indicating a check in the 
an10unt of $25.00 was enclosed, and that Mrs. Edwards 
intended to pay off the balance as quickly as possible. 
Mrs. Edwards at this time admitted an obligation 
but attempted to explain that said obligation was for a 
sales party she had put on for Mrs. Bolger (Tr. 36 and 
37). The Defendant Beth Edwards then testified that this 
obligation was completely paid within a week or ten days 
from 'that time (Tr. 39). Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 was then 
introduced, which was admitted to be a letter from Mrs. 
Edwards to Mrs. Bolger postmarked February 24, 1961 
which indicated Mrs. Edwards wanted to know the bal-
ance owing to Mrs. Bolger. No satisfactory explanation 
was given as to the purpose of such a letter inasmuch 
as Mrs. Edwards claimed to owe nothing at this time. 
Mr. and Mrs. Edwards testified that Mr. and Mrs. 
Bolger and their son came to the said Defendant's home 
at a time they were unable to recall definitely, and picked 
up all the merchandise listed on Defendant's Exhibits 5 
and 6. They further testified that each item 1vas boxed 
and as it was removed from the basement of the De-
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fondant's home, it was typed on a list by Mrs. Bolger 
(rl'r. 32, 53, 54), and that the merchandise was placed in 
tlw automobile of the Plaintiff, and said return of mer-
chandise satisfied any obligation which was outstanding. 
rrhe Plaintiff and the husband of the Plaintiff testi-
fied that they did receive certain merchandise but only 
that valued as set forth in the amended complaint here-
in, and that nothing further was removed from the home 
of the Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF POINrrs 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 WAS 
INTENDE'D ONLY TO EVIDENCE DELIVERY OF MER-
CHANDISE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
IS CONTRARY TO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND OVER-
WHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF. 
Appellant is cognizant of the rule that this Court will 
not weigh evidence and will sustain a judgment in law 
action if the same is supported by competent substantial 
evidence. However, the Court has stated in Jensen vs. 
Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P.2d 1037: 
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of 
findings of a trial court in law cases is different 
from that in equity cases. In the former the 
findings as a general rule are approved if there 
is sufficient competent evidence to support them 
and ordinarily are not disturbed unless it is mani-
fest that they are so clearly against the weight 
of evidence as to indicate a misconception or not 
a due consideration of it." 
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The Court further stated in the case of Seybold v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Comparny, 121 Utah 61, 239 P.2d 
17 4, in reversing the findings of the jury : 
"If there is any substantial competent evi-
dence upon which a jury, acting fairly and reason-
ably, could make the finding, it should stand, 
but if the finding is no plainly unreasonable as to 
convince the court that no jury, acting fairly and 
reasonably, could make such a finding, it cannot 
be said to be supported by substantial evidence." 
There is no testimony supporting the finding that 
the Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is merely evidence of delivery 
of merchandise and not a promissory note, except the 
self-serving statements of the Defendants, and these are 
contrary to the written evidence which was introduced. 
All of the parties testified that Exhibit 1 was executed 
by the Defendants on the 5th day of March, 1960 (Tr. 
9, 50, 58). Further, Mrs. Edwards testified that the docu-
ment was not a complicated one and that she understood 
it. It is evident that the document speaks for itself and 
it sets forth no factors which would inidicate it was to be 
accepted as a delivery receipt, although an attempt was 
made to have the Court so interpret. 
In the case of Taylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 717, 127 P. 
66, at Page 68, the Court stated: 
"But of course the court was not bound to 
accept this explanation and it is well recognized 
as a matter of law as well as of plain common 
sense that an account of a transaction given in 
contemporaneous writing when no differences 
have arisen is to be pref ered to a substantial oral 
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explanation at variance with the writing given 
after differences have arisen." 
ro the :::;rune effect is the decision m the case of 
Smith v. Goethe, 159 Cal. 628, 115 P. 223, wherein the 
Court stated: 
"The uncertain statements of Carmichael 
made yearn after the event under examination 
should not be permitted to prevail against the 
formal written declaration of the partie'S made at 
the time of the transaction and as part of it." 
Appellant calls attention to the answer to the amend-
ed complaint wherein the Defendant Clyde Edwards' at-
torney states plainly that Exhibit 1 was not executed by 
the Defendant Clyde Edwards, and that it was not until 
said Defendant was required to answer under oath that 
he admitted that his signature was placed upon Def end-
ant's Exhibit 1. 
Accepting the testimony of the Defendants to the 
intent of the said Exhibit 11 in the light of all the evidence 
to the contrary, is harsh, unfair and inequitable. 
Further evidence of an existing obligation was given, 
although an attempt was made to explain away said evi-
dence, when Mrs. Edwards was specifically asked whether 
she was indebted to the Plaintiff in any fashion after 
the date of the promissory note of March 5, 1960. Def end-
ant Mrs. Edwards emphatically denied that she was obli-
gated from the date and thereafter there was nothing 
owing by Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff (Tr. 36). ~Where-
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upon, Mrs. Edwards was confronted with Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7, which was a letter bearing date of October 5, 
1960, from Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff, indicating 
that the Defendant Mrs. Edwards was sending a check 
for $25.00 and would send more in the future. 
Mrs. Edwards attempted to explain the obligation 
was for a sales party which she had put on for the Plain-
tiff, and that within a week or ten days she had paid 
everything owing in full (Tr. 39), again emphasizing that 
nothing further was owing to the Plaintiff from that 
time. Mrs. Edwards then was confronted with Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8 which was a letter postmarked February 24, 
1961, from Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff, requesting in-
formation as to the amount owing from the Defendant 
to the Plaintiff. The Defendant Mrs. Edwards was un-
able to off er any satisfactory explanation for the letter. 
All of the documents evidence an obligation owing from 
the Defendants to the Plaintiff, and none support the 
allegations that the promissory note, Plaintiff's Etlibit 
1, was a receipt of delivery. Defendants were credited 
$25.00 for cash payment, together with return of mer-
chandise in the amount of $43. 70, pursuant to the plead-
ings filed herein. 
POINT 'TIWO 
THE FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS RETURNED 
CERTAIN MERCHANDISE, THEREBY SATISFYING ANY 
OBLIGATION REPRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
I IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND OVERWHELM-
' 
ING WEIGHT THEREOF. 
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The finding that the Defendants returned the mer-
chandise in question, thereby satisfying the obligation 
represented by Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, relies solely upon 
the self-serving statements of the Defendants. It is not 
substantiated by any reliable evidence. Mrs. Ida Elliott 
testified that she observed some boxes being removed 
from the home of the Defendants by the Plaintiff, but did 
not know how many were removed (Tr. 58) and was only 
present for a few minutes during the transfer (Tr. 59). 
Plaintiff had by the pleadings admitted receipt of $43.70 
in returned merchandise, and Mrs. Edwards testified 
that she had made receipt cards out to Mrs. Bolger, and 
that was her general practice (Tr. 42). However, she of-
fered no further evidence of receipt cards for the balance 
in question. Mr. Edwards further testified that at the 
time Mrs. Bolger was alleged to have picked up the bulk 
of the material, she received no written document or any 
receipt from Mrs. Bolger, (Tr. 43) even though she had 
testified earlier that it was her practice always to make 
out receipt cards upon delivery of merchandise. (Tr. 
42) The Defendant Mrs. Edwards later testified that as 
the merchandise was taken from her basement, the Ap-
pellant Mrs. Bolger typed up a list (Tr. 32). Mr. Ed-
wards stated that as merchandise was taken from the 
shelves and boxed, Mrs. Bolger typed a list and Mrs. Ed-
wards checked the items as they were taken from the 
basement and loaded into the Bolger automobile by .Mr. 
Bolger and his son and Mr. Edwards and his son (Tr. 
52). 
It is not within the realm of possibility that 602 
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items could he listed as they were removed from the 
Bolger home in March, 19'60, transported to the Edwards 
home in Utah County and unloaded in a basement, with-
out concern as to the order in which the merchandise 
was placed on shelves, and then several months later be 
reboxed and removed from the basement in the exact 
order as they were taken from the original storage area of 
the Plaintiff Mrs. Bolger. This is precisely what the De-
fendants ask the Court to believe, as the list of merchan-
dise, Defendant's ffixhibits 5 and 6, is purported to be a 
list of the merchandise which was removed from the base-
ment of the Edwards home, and which conforms in exact 
sequence to the list set forth in Defendants' Exhibits 2 
and 3, which is a list of the merchandise originally taken 
from the Plaintiff's premises (Tr. 54). 
The Edwards set forth said Exhibits 5 and 6 to be 
the receipts by Plaintiff to the Defendants for the mer-
chandise in question. There is no signature or any docu-
mentary evidence to establish the fact that said exhibits 
werein fact receipts. It is apparent that they are merely 
duplicate copies of of the original list which was prepared 
by the Plaintiff when the merchandise was sold in March, 
1960, by the Plaintiff to the Defendants. 
It is further noted that the Defendant Beth Edwards 
testified that the invoices which were given to the Plain-
tiff evidencing a return of certain merchandise contained 
certain items that were in the original delivery to the 
Defendants (Tr. 1'7 and 31). Yet the list shown in De-
fendant's Exhibits 5 and 6 shows exactly the same ma-
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terial as listed in the original exhibit listing the merchan-
dise (Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3) without the removal 
of any of the items set forth in said invoices. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' evidence that the promissory note was used 
as a receipt for merchandise and their evidence of the 
return of all of the merchandise to the Plaintiff is so un-
rem;onable that it :::;hould be rejected as a matter of law. 
A:::; this court said in Continental Bank & Tritst Com-
pcvny vs. R. W. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, 
892: 
"While it is true that the testimony of a wit-
ness such as Mr. Cheney would ordinarily be re-
garded as sufficient to compel the affirmance of 
the trial court's finding, that is not necessarily 
so under all circumstances. Defendant is correct 
in arguing that even though the testimony stand-
ing alone might be sufficient to support a finding, 
it must always be appraised in the light of all the 
attendant circumstances and countervailing testi-
mony. If when so viewed, it appears so clearly 
and palpably unreasonable that no fact trier, act-
ing fairly and reasonably, could accept it, then it 
must be rejected as a matter of law, and the fact 
determined otherwise. This is particularly so here 
where Mr. Cheney had such a vital personal inter-
est in the controversey, since it obviously would be 
greatly to his advantage if he could fix upon Mr. 
Stewart the responsibility of paying this large un-
secured personal debt." 
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Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE B. WELLING 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
